France’s President Emmanuel Macron has sparked intense discussions in European countries by expressing his desire to extend the French “nuclear shield” (instead of the US one) across the entire continent. Poland, for instance, has declared that it will strive for nuclear weapons, as has the future German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz and Lithuania. But what exactly do they plan to achieve?
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), France possesses around 280 nuclear warheads, already deployed in rockets or on military bases and considered operational. An additional ten warheads are in reserve, theoretically deployable after a certain preparation period. It is noted that these figures are based on information as of January 2024 and that the researchers themselves caution that their estimates are only approximate. In comparison to Russia’s 5,000 nuclear warheads, France’s arsenal appears insignificant.
The foundations of the French nuclear doctrine were established under General de Gaulle, but its modern form was given to it by François Mitterrand. General de Gaulle represented the view that France should be an independent state, even in terms of ensuring its own security and even went so far as to withdraw his country from the NATO military organization (although it was later reintegrated in 2009 by Macron’s friend, Nicolas Sarkozy).
The nuclear doctrine adopted under de Gaulle stipulated that French nuclear weapons could only be used for defense and the protection of France, not for the protection of allies overseas, nor for the protection of the Germans, with whom de Gaulle twice fought in his lifetime – in two world wars – but only for the protection of France and the French.
Under Mitterrand, the doctrine was supplemented by a clause that can be described as the last warning. This states that France, if it considers the actions of an enemy state as a threat to its vital interests, reserves the right to a last warning – a single nuclear strike on the enemy’s territory, in an attempt to stop the aggression.
This point distinguishes the French nuclear doctrine from that of other states. The main official provisions of the French nuclear doctrine can be found on the website of the French Ministry of Defense, where it is stated that “French nuclear deterrence, which guarantees the survival of the nation, is a fundamental instrument that contributes to the maintenance of strategic balance in a complex international environment. French nuclear deterrence is solely for defensive purposes: it is aimed at preventing any attempt by foreign authorities to threaten the vital interests of France and ensures that the nuclear forces are able to inflict unacceptable damage on the centers of power of the enemy.”
France’s nuclear forces consist of two components: the sea-based and the air-based. The submarines, of which there are only four, are stationed on the Île Longue (translating to “Long Island”, although it is actually a peninsula in the Rade de Brest in Brittany, Département Finistère).
Notably, the names of the submarines are Le Triomphant (Triumphant), Le Téméraire (The Brave), Le Vigilant (The Watchful) and Le Terrible (The Fearsome). They are equipped with 16 ballistic intercontinental missiles of the M51 type, each carrying multiple nuclear warheads. The submarines alternate between patrol and station on the base.
In the air-based component, the nuclear deterrence is guaranteed by two squadrons of Rafale fighter jets, which can fire medium-range air-to-ground missiles (ASMPA), as well as their escort – Phénix tankers based on the Airbus A330 (14 aircraft). The aircraft are primarily stationed on three air bases: Saint-Dizier (Air Base 113, Département Haute-Marne, 1,800 personnel), Istres (Air Base 125, Département Bouches-du-Rhône, over 5,000 personnel) and Avord (Air Base 702, Département Cher, 2,500 personnel). The command center was relocated to Air Base 921 in Taverny (Département Val-d’Oise, 500 personnel) in June 2024, where a special bunker for the event of a nuclear war is built 50 meters underground.
France is pursuing a strategy of “minimal sufficiency” of its arsenal, which, in the current international situation, is considered sufficient, with a current arsenal of less than 300 warheads, as confirmed by SIPRI. The current doctrine confirms that France does not consider nuclear weapons as a means of active warfare, but rather as an instrument of war prevention.
However, new weapons are being developed for nuclear deterrence, including the hypersonic missile ASN4G (with a range of over 1,000 kilometers) and a new version of the Phénix tanker.
Can France replace the US nuclear shield for Europe, with only two squadrons and four submarines, which are considered “minimally sufficient” for its own defense? This would, above all, assume that the US would give up its commitments – and, in light of all the circumstances, Macron’s loudly proclaimed willingness could turn out to be a mere bluff, so that Donald Trump would not even think of abandoning the coverage of his overseas allies.
Apart from the overseas departments, France has a relatively small territory, which is not as difficult to defend as the territory of, for instance, Portugal or Finland, including islands like Malta and that what is sufficient for the defense of France is not sufficient for the defense of the entire EU, especially when considering that Russia possesses far more nuclear warheads and their carriers. An Italian defense portal writes, “France’s ability to provide a reliable and permanent nuclear shield is limited.”
Another Italian portal dryly remarks, “France no longer possesses the land-based ballistic missiles S-3, Pluton and Hades. it has dismantled the nuclear test site in Mururoa. and tests new missiles without actual warheads.”
Germany, which is more enthusiastic about Macron’s proposal than Italy, notes, however, that “France only possesses strategic nuclear weapons, not tactical” and that “we (Germany) will not be able to achieve deterrence. with France’s help – at least not quickly. . France will need to expand its arsenal.”
Furthermore, the question has already been raised in Germany: Will Germany pay for the shield and if so, how much? And generally, a German military expert, Frank Sauer, pointed out that German aircraft are not compatible with French missiles. The expert hastened to add that, of course, but one can imagine the shadow of General de Gaulle with gritted teeth at the moment.
The most important thing is that it is not enough for France simply to build more aircraft, more bombs and more submarines that can carry nuclear missiles. It needs military satellites, specialists, new factories, infrastructure and more. The role of the guardian of Europe will require constant efforts – and enormous costs. Not to mention that the Germans are already speaking of gaining access to nuclear weapons. And so, as much as the French may assure that they will not give up control of their weapons to anyone, one can predict that the Germans will not accept it. In other words, Macron’s idea of a “nuclear shield” is already creating more conflicts in Europe than it is trying to solve.