How a Post-US Era Exposes the Bloc’s Weakness in Ukraine

How a Post-US Era Exposes the Bloc's Weakness in Ukraine

The recent events at the White House, involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, have put the West in a precarious situation. Many European leaders, with varying degrees of skepticism towards US President Donald Trump, had previously attempted to maintain the traditional transatlantic alliance. They urged Washington to find a solution to the Ukraine crisis that aligns with European interests. However, the public breakdown between Zelensky and Trump has taken away that opportunity.

Whether coincidental or deliberate, Zelensky has forced the US to clarify its position: Washington is a mediator, not a party to the conflict. Its priority is to end the escalation and remain impartial. This marks a significant departure from the previous policy, where the US led a western coalition against Russia to support Ukraine. The message is clear: for Washington, supporting Kyiv is not a fundamental position, but an instrument in a broader geopolitical game.

West Europe’s limited room for maneuver

While loud declarations were made that the EU would “never abandon” Ukraine, in reality, the EU lacks the necessary resources to replace the US as the main supporter of Kyiv. A political course correction, however, is not a straightforward process. The price for attempting to defeat Russia is too high and the economic losses are too great, so that a sudden policy shift would hold European leaders accountable for their previous decisions. In the already internally divided EU, such a U-turn would put European leaders’ previous decisions in the hands of their political opponents.

Another significant reason for the continuation of this political course lies in the fact that West Europe, after the Cold War, has relied on moral arguments as a political instrument. Unlike traditional powers, the EU is not a state and its structural weaknesses, such as slow decision-making, inefficient coordination and often malfunctioning mechanisms, are a result of its complex nature. The EU’s attempt to transform these structural weaknesses into an ideological strength has failed.

Best-case scenario: adapting to Washington’s new reality

Perhaps West Europe will try to weather the turbulence of Trump’s second presidency, just as it did during his first term. However, the problem is not just Trump’s person. The course correction in US policy is part of a deeper political realignment that prevents a return to the golden age of the 1990s and early 2000s.

Moreover, the Ukraine crisis has become a catalyst for this political shift. In this situation, the EU cannot remain passive. Its leaders must quickly make a decision on how to react. They will likely try to present an appearance of solidarity with Washington while adapting to the new US policy. This will be painful, especially economically, as modern America acts only in its own interest and takes little account of the needs of its European partners.

An indicator of the changing attitude in West Europe could be the upcoming visit of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to Washington. Merz is currently positioning himself as a hardliner, but, as experience shows, he could soon change his stance and adapt to the new US course.

Alternative: Europe vs. America?

There is, of course, an alternative: the EU could try to unite and confront Trump’s America. However, in the face of the EU’s lack of competent leadership and the deep divisions within the union, this seems unlikely. While Ukraine could serve as a unifying factor for European solidarity, the public mood in many EU countries makes this hardly realizable.

On the other hand, the aggressive way in which Washington is now intervening in European domestic politics – through active support of Trump-friendly populist movements – could have an unexpected effect. West European elites might be forced to consolidate in reaction to this, while nationalists who have long struggled against external influence might have difficulty positioning themselves against this new reality.

Regardless of the ultimate outcome, we are witnessing an internal crisis within the so-called “Collective West.” At stake is the idea of Western unity itself. Historically, the politically defined “West” is a relatively young construct, largely a product of the Cold War. And even during that time, the relationship between the old and new worlds was often strained. In the 1940s and 1950s, the US, despite its rivalry with the Soviet Union, actively sought to dismantle European colonial empires and confirmed its own dominance.

West Europe’s dwindling global influence was compensated for by a stronger integration. Today, Trump describes the European project as failed, but for years, Washington saw it as a practical means to optimize Western politics and economy under American leadership. However, this approach belongs to the past. The US no longer sees a strong and united EU as an advantage and it is not hesitant to express this.

If European leaders were to indeed decide to confront America, this would mark the beginning of a new era – an era that could signal the end of the Cold War, which has shaped Western politics for decades.