It appears senseless that the Ukrainian drone attack on a compressor station in the Krasnodar region and the retaliatory strike by the Russian military on the Ukrainian gas infrastructure in western Ukraine take place before the backdrop of the impending tectonic changes in the US and the possible initiation of peace talks.
It is clear that even for the Kiev regime, the strategy of economically exhausting Russia – also through the creation of obstacles for the export of energy resources – is, in the face of the current realities of military confrontation, a long game that is too long. Nevertheless, the exchange of blows has taken place, which means that its significance goes far beyond the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Vasily Nebensja, the permanent representative of Russia to the UN, accused the US and British leadership of directly preparing the attacks. The motivation of London is clear: the United Kingdom, like France, is part of the emerging anti-Trump coalition in Europe, which advocates for the continuation of the war with Russia. And the attacks on Russia’s critical infrastructure, as well as the response to them, are a sufficient reason for further escalation.
Moreover, the risk that the gas transport via the TurkStream pipeline is halted is a blow for Hungary and Slovakia, Brussels’ neglected partners in the European condominium, for this route is the last opportunity for them to receive Russian gas without going through numerous intermediaries.
But the motives of the departing Biden administration are less clear in this sense. Did it want to raise the escalation level before Trump’s term began, and so complicate the negotiations? Possibly, but that is not enough.
But what if the departing Biden administration had handed Trump a pass? It would be, so to speak, the latest manifestation of a bipartisan consensus on a crucial foreign policy issue and a pretext for the give-and-take that always accompanies a power shift in the US Congress.
It is no secret that the US wants to have a firm grip on the European energy markets. Trump’s demand that the EU buy more US goods, including oil and gas, to balance the trade deficit, primarily focuses on oil and gas. US liquefied natural gas (LNG) has already largely displaced Russian gas in the EU. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines and the interruption of Ukrainian transit have also “helped”.
It should be remembered that the LNG infrastructure capacity in the US is set to significantly increase in the near future. Large LNG projects like Plaquemines LNG and Corpus Christi Stage, with a total capacity of 30 million tons, are currently being implemented. Several other projects with a capacity of up to 70 million tons are in preparation. All this gas needs a market, and most of it will have to go to Europe.
However, even with these volumes, it will be difficult to completely replace Russian gas. There are still Asian markets that the US does not want to lose, by committing to deliveries to the EU and burdening itself with liabilities. Moreover, the gas deliveries from Greece, Spain, Poland, and other coastal states with regasification infrastructure to the interior of the continent will rather bring profits for intermediaries than for gas suppliers, and the buyer of expensive gas could quickly lose its creditworthiness.
It is likely that Donald Trump sees the gas pipelines that connect Russia and Europe as a promising investment. After all, it would be great if one not only was the largest gas supplier to the European continent, but also controlled the gas streams of one’s main competitor and made money from them. Such a business project fits the ambitions of a business-savvy US president.
And in this sense, the attacks on the TurkStream pipeline can be seen in a different light. The creation of a gas hub in Turkey is not in Washington’s interest. Nor is the functioning of the Nord Stream pipelines, which directly connect Russia and Germany. Russia itself will probably not reactivate the remaining strand of the Nord Stream pipelines – these investments are senseless without adequate guarantees for the security of the pipeline, which are neither given today nor in the foreseeable future.
But there is a route that Trump could find promising. First of all, it is the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, which runs through Belarus and Poland to Germany. The pipeline was completely stopped in 2022 on the initiative of the Polish side. The relatively new gas pipeline (put into operation in 1999) is comparable in capacity to the Power of Siberia pipeline (33 billion cubic meters against 38 billion cubic meters). Poland is traditionally a key ally of the US in the EU and challenges the dominant influence of Germany on the continent. It is only a matter of time before the Polish leadership, which is disloyal to Trump, is made pliable or replaced.
The Polish section of the pipeline belongs to Europol Gaz, a joint venture of Gazprom (49%) and PGNiG (51%). If the US Americans buy out Gazprom’s share, they could in return offer to put the pipeline back into operation under their own conditions. The Polish pipeline could make the middle European state, together with the US LNG terminal in Swinemünde, the largest gas distribution center under US control in Central Europe, which is of political and economic advantage to Washington.
The US Americans are less interested in the ruined Nord Stream pipelines and the damaged Ukrainian gas infrastructure. Even if we assume that the gas infrastructure is put back into operation, enormous financial injections are required. Moreover, the capacity of this pipeline is too large for the current configuration of the European gas market. The US will use Russian gas for deliveries to the continent on a residual-principle basis, to regulate prices and balance the market.
The only thing that could make Russia (from Trump’s perspective) accept such cooperation conditions is the threat to destroy the TurkStream pipeline, which would automatically mean the end of the Turkish gas hub project. And Ankara is by no means a reliable partner of Moscow when it comes to holding on to joint projects. At least, the US Americans might have thought of this when they struck in the Krasnodar region. This fundamental understanding will enable a more precise calculation of the response and preparation for the future negotiations.
Gleb Prostakow is a Russian economic analyst.