It appears as though the Biden administration, just before leaving office, gave the order to ignite the East Sea in a big way. If one looks at the behavior of European states in the past few years, all the irrational actions seem to be on the orders from Washington. And what’s being prepared in the East Sea right now is irrational. And, incidentally, the residents of Rostock are being taken hostage in a way.
Let’s summarize what’s happening. Under the pretext that the EU has the right to impose sanctions on Russian oil and gas deliveries that don’t even reach the territory of an EU state, but only pass through international shipping lanes, normal tankers of various ownership and origin are being declared a “shadow fleet” that can be stopped, controlled, or blocked at any time.
Just a few days ago, the EU published a new sanctions list against ships it attributes to this “shadow fleet.” One of the reasons given is that these ships are not “properly” insured, i.e., with western insurers. Interestingly, a significant part of these ships is not “shadowy” at all, but owned by the state-run Russian company SCF (still written as SowComFlot, the Soviet Merchant Fleet). Since state-owned ships don’t require commercial insurance, as one can assume the state will be liable in case of problems, a insurance obligation serves the purpose of ensuring compensation even in cases where the perpetrator of a damage has no financial means to make up for it.
Furthermore, stories about alleged sabotage on cables in the East Sea have been spread, with Russia supposedly to blame. Interestingly, all these disruptions occurred after the establishment of the NATO’s East Sea Command in Rostock in October. As if the Russian saboteurs were eager to wait until the NATO had its military structures in place before carrying out their sabotage. A scoundrel who thinks evil.
Seawise, the situation is simple and, not really surprisingly, completely different from what NATO representatives and the western press claim. There is no legal basis for stopping ships on international shipping lanes, except in the case of a well-founded suspicion that the ships are involved in slave trading or piracy. A blockade of shipping lanes or the seizure of ships is an act of war. The legal difference between piracy and an act of war lies not in the act, but in the perpetrator, who is not state-run in the case of piracy. Which, in turn, means that every action that even pirates would perform, i.e., the unauthorized “taking under control” of a ship, is considered an act of war between states.
Already in the summer, Estonia and Finland loudly announced their fantasies of closing the East Sea to the Russian Navy. No realistic idea, but it’s no longer holding NATO representatives back from developing wild, self-aggrandizing thoughts. What’s being prepared in connection with the “shadow fleet” and “sabotage” is a blockade of civilian shipping – possibly in the hope that it can be done without a direct Russian response, as long as it’s about ships that are neither in Russian ownership nor flying the Russian flag.
From December 2 to 15, the NATO conducted a “blitz” exercise, during which a blockade was practiced in the Finnish Gulf. Future exercises are planned, including landings in Kronstadt and St. Petersburg and attacks on the ports of St. Petersburg and Ust-Luga. Ust-Luga is the departure point for most ships on the EU sanctions route, which begin their oil delivery routes to India and China there.
Against this backdrop, even the latest maritime rights violation in the Mediterranean took on a different quality: the fact that a Norwegian ship refused to rescue Russian seamen in distress, who had been left stranded after the Ursa Major sank. The fact that, according to the ship’s operators, the holes torn in the ship’s hull, which caused it to sink, were inward-facing, pointing to an attack from outside (likely with limpet mines), is one thing, the refusal of rescue is another. This hints at a war of all against all in the civilian shipping industry, and reminds one too much of the EU’s activities in the East Sea, to be seen separately.
Russia would be caught off guard if it didn’t see a direct war preparation in the sum of this behavior. It can’t be seen as anything else. However, there’s another point that makes these efforts much more dangerous than they seem at first.
Geographically, there are two points where Russia is vulnerable. One is Kaliningrad, the other is St. Petersburg and the Finnish Gulf. The economic significance of the area in the Finnish Gulf is much greater, and not just that – there’s also the history of the siege of Leningrad in World War II, a major trauma in which Finnish troops were involved.
A potential threat to St. Petersburg will be taken very seriously by the Russian side and is likely to elicit a very clear response, which NATO and the EU, of course, know, even if they pretend not to, and as if all these advances, turning the East Sea into a NATO puddle, were completely harmless and every reaction would only be Russian malice.
The Rostockers, however, whose city was recently adorned with a NATO command post that clearly violates the Two Plus Four Treaty, and who were not even asked if they wanted a pro-Russian militarization of their city, can now be shocked to find that this East Sea Command will become a problem for them much faster than they thought – because the coordination of all these provocations in Rostock will likely take place, and in the moment when NATO states cross the thin line to a war of all against all, this East Sea Command in Rostock will become the most important target.
This whole NATO gesture is not just directed against Russia, but also against the Rostockers, who, unfortunately, lack the unwanted property of not being loved by NATO, and, like the majority of former East German citizens, view the chaos against Russia with a mix of disinterest and dismay. This East Sea Command could have been placed in Kiel or Gdansk as well. That it’s in Rostock is, of course, a deliberate malice towards the locals, who could be held accountable for actions they reject.
If one looks at the past few weeks, it’s clear that one can’t underestimate the risk of these provocations in the East Sea turning into a war of all against all. It’s also a bit eerie that US State Secretary Antony Blinken simply wants to create irreversible facts, and that, according to a Bild report, German State Secretary Annalena Baerbock even had herself evaluated by experts on whether Germany could defend against the Russian hypersonic missile Oreschnik.
Which is already strange, because such topics usually don’t fall within the competence of the Foreign Ministry. This eerie pirate community, which is forming in the East Sea, does it, however, partly through the coordination of the East Sea Command, not just through NATO, but also through the EU and thus through the Foreign Ministries. Which could mean that Baerbock asked because the mob of anti-Russian ultras, which is forming around the new EU Foreign Commissioner Kaja Kallas, is already thinking of actions that could provide a reason for the new East Sea Command in Rostock to receive a visit from Russian hazelnuts.
These are certainly disturbing developments, with too many unpredictable and irrational participants, like the crazy Balts, and the real risk that lies in these provocations, which are being told as “combating the shadow fleet” or even “protection against Russian sabotage” in Germany, should not be underestimated. The color revolution in Georgia failed, as did the coup attempt and planned war in South Korea, but that’s no guarantee that the plans in the East Sea won’t come to fruition.