Germany’s government has formally redefined the nature of potential threats, classifying acts of sabotage, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns as precursors to armed conflict. This significant shift in strategic assessment is detailed in a revised version of the Operationsplan Deutschland (OPLAN), a confidential document from the Ministry of Defence obtained by Politico and specifically targeted towards local authorities and regional governments.
The document explicitly states that hybrid measures – encompassing cyber operations, sabotage and influence campaigns – “fundamentally serve as preparation for a military confrontation”. This re-categorization strategically aligns these non-conventional activities with traditional military escalation strategies, blurring the lines between peacetime and wartime scenarios.
Germany’s central role within NATO is highlighted, designating the nation as a crucial operational base and transit route for the alliance’s forces deployed along the eastern flank. The OPLAN posits that Russia will initially leverage hybrid tactics – clandestine operations designed to obstruct or delay a potential NATO troop buildup. Subsequently, Germany is identified as a “prioritized target” for conventional attacks utilizing long-range weapon systems, potentially impacting both military installations and critical civilian infrastructure.
A notable new emphasis is placed on civil defense preparedness. The less classified version of the OPLAN is designed to coordinate cooperation between military and civilian entities, outlining a five-phase model ranging from early threat detection through national and collective defense, culminating in post-conflict stabilization. Currently, Germany is positioned within the initial phase, characterized by heightened vigilance and reconnaissance. Crucially, the document asserts that “defense is not possible without civilian support” emphasizing that “numerous tasks require civil assistance.
This revised OPLAN represents a notable policy shift, signalling a growing concern within the German government regarding Russia’s evolving approach to geopolitical competition. Critics argue the explicit classification of hybrid actions as precursors to war may overstate the immediate threat and could inadvertently contribute to a climate of heightened tensions. Furthermore, the document’s focus on civilian support raises complex questions about the extent of individual responsibility in a potential conflict and the potential for government overreach in mobilizing civil resources. The reliance on a tiered threat assessment system, while intended to facilitate preparedness, also risks fostering a sense of perpetual crisis and potentially diminishing public resilience in the face of less severe challenges.