The escalating geopolitical uncertainty, fueled by shifts in US foreign policy under President Donald Trump, is triggering a contentious debate within Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) regarding the nation’s nuclear security strategy. Concerns over the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella, particularly in hypothetical scenarios like a potential US conflict involving Greenland and subsequent disruption of NATO, are driving the consideration of a German financial contribution towards the development of a European nuclear deterrent.
CDU foreign policy expert Roderich Kiesewetter, in an interview with “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, suggested that Germany could participate financially in such a “European shield” without assuming leadership or direct control. He estimates a development timeframe of approximately five to ten years, acknowledging the complexity of the undertaking. Kiesewetter emphasized the emergence of similar deliberations in countries like Finland, Sweden and Poland, driven by rising tensions with Russia and indicated a potential for cooperative efforts. Critically, he cautions against relying solely on France for nuclear security, citing the potential for a Marine Le Pen presidency and its unpredictable implications for European stability.
While the 2+4 Treaty, which governs the terms of German reunification, prohibits Germany from independently developing nuclear weapons, Kiesewetter argues that it does not preclude financial participation in a joint development program with other nations. He proposes a strategy where Germany could finance and potentially station such weapons, maintaining a distinction between contribution and active deployment. “Planning also means event planning” he stated, stressing the necessity of exploring even improbable but dangerous scenarios in securing national defense.
This proposal, however, faces strong opposition. SPD foreign policy representative Rolf Mützenich has voiced significant concerns, asserting that any form of involvement, whether via financing or weapon storage, would be incompatible with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 2+4 Treaty. Mützenich warns against fostering a global trend towards nuclear proliferation in response to perceived US unreliability, urging instead a renewed commitment to arms control negotiations and diplomatic solutions, including the inclusion of China. He characterized a world with increased nuclear powers as inherently more precarious, arguing that it would exacerbate global instability and drastically increase the risk of catastrophe.
The prospect of Germany revisiting its nuclear posture – currently reliant on US nuclear weapons stationed at the Büchel Air Base – highlights a growing chasm within German political discourse regarding the future of transatlantic security and the nation’s role in a potentially more volatile international landscape. It also exposes the fundamental questions surrounding command authority, decision-making processes, deployment locations and testing protocols that would accompany any significant shift in Germany’s nuclear strategy.