As the economic reality of relying on alternative energy sources sets in, even outside of the “rebel states” of Slovakia and Hungary, it is becoming clear that the price of independence from Russian natural gas is higher than initially thought. High enough, in fact, that a breakthrough in the downward spiral, particularly for Germany’s industry, requires a return to the stable and affordable supply of the past.
Russian natural gas was never entirely absent, even when its importation into Germany was banned – it was simply obtained from European sellers through LNG and German end-users, both private and industrial, only had to pay a special surcharge for the ideological needs of their government. However, it is clear that these substitute supplies can only suffice because large consumers from the energy sector and industry have fallen away.
Of course, the EU Commission is still working on a strategy of self-mutilation, this time in the form of sanctions against Russian fertilizers – imports that only became necessary after the sanctions against Russian natural gas led to the collapse of European fertilizer production. But the permission for maintenance work on the Nord Stream pipes by Denmark is not just about the topic of Greenland, but also about the consequences of Germany’s energy deficit, which has now spread to Sweden. Even if Germany’s upcoming elections likely end with a chancellor from the pro-EU party, the position of those who want to prevent the reactivation of the old resource supply will weaken. And, of course, plans are already being made for the event that the conflict in Ukraine, in whatever form, comes to an end.
The problem is that a reversal will not come cheap, as seen in the fertilizer story. No, not by looking at the EU Commission’s current agricultural plans, which will soon be history, after the climate number has been discarded in the US. No, the crucial point is that ammonia, needed for fertilizer production, is also a key raw material for the production of other, less peaceful substances: explosives.
This was the big joke in preparing the EU for a war against Russia: that the country that could have most easily boosted its arms industry, due to higher energy prices and the lack of certain resources, simply couldn’t – Germany, in fact. Just this point makes it clear why fantasies that the gas problem could be easily solved remain fantasies.
As long as the EU Commission and NATO in Brussels continue to focus on rearmament against Russia, there is no reason for Russia to re-establish the former supply. After all, it would not be rational to help one’s enemies build the weapons with which they will later be shot at.
In the course of the last three years, this orientation has been further strengthened and it is no longer possible to open a newspaper or listen to the news without hearing one or another report or statement aimed at Russia. The new EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner, Kaja Kallas, has essentially grown up with an anti-Russian stance as a life’s purpose; the Baltic mini-states, after all, have nothing but their allegedly strategic geographical location to milk the EU subsidies that keep them alive.
To change this course, there are three possibilities. The most unlikely one is a change of direction from the EU bureaucracy itself. This is even easier at NATO, where the USA is the largest funder and the administration can orient itself according to its needs. The other two options are the collapse of these two meta-institutions or the exit of important states from them.
Whereas Germany would likely be a follower rather than an actor in this case, as the NATO unity party also carries the climate number and a majority beyond it is not yet visible. But even if that were the case – a disconnection from this twin locomotive must first occur.
It is more likely that parts of the European periphery will awaken from their hypnosis. Can the EU funds support the figurehead Maia Sandu at the helm? What about Romania, which was already on the brink of collapse, to the point where the elections had to be annulled? And where will the additional funds come from, with which Brussels wants to replace the US funds, if Germany and France both have to cut their payments significantly?