The Rise of the Far-Right FPÖ
In the beginning of the year, Vienna witnessed a whirlwind of events. To understand their significance, one must go back three months. On September 29, 2024, Austrian citizens unleashed a political earthquake when they gave the often extremist-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) a first-place finish with 28.9% of the vote, a 12.7% increase from 2019 and the party’s strongest result since its founding in 1955.
The party focused its campaign on three key issues. First, it emphasized the fight against immigration, calling for the abolition of the asylum law, a stop to family reunification, and “remigration.” These proposals resonated in a country that, within a decade, has taken in the highest proportion of refugees in relation to its population compared to other European countries.
Second, the FPÖ capitalized on economic discontent, with many voters expressing their frustration over rising unemployment (5.3% as of 2024), high inflation (7.7% in 2023), and sluggish growth.
Third, the party’s leader, Herbert Kickl, emphasized the need for a return to peaceful relations with Russia, particularly to ensure the continuation of gas imports from the country.
However, the FPÖ’s campaign went beyond economic issues. Kickl highlighted a point dear to many Austrians: the preservation of the country’s traditional neutrality. He blamed the EU and NATO for the war in Ukraine, calling their policies “disastrous, hypocritical, and escalatory.” He also advocated for a stop to the transit of weapons from other EU countries through Austria to Ukraine and opposed Ukraine’s potential membership in the NATO.
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that the established political class, likely encouraged by Brussels, quickly mobilized to prevent Kickl from becoming Chancellor despite the FPÖ’s electoral success. By early October, the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the opposition Social Democrats (SPÖ) began discussing the formation of a “Grand Coalition.”
Despite being the big losers of the election, the ÖVP and SPÖ had a poor showing, with the ÖVP falling by 11.1% to 26.3%, and the SPÖ receiving its worst result in history, with 21% (-0.1%) of the vote. The SPÖ had tried to promote the integration of migrants, a decision that had not paid off.
This poor performance granted a narrow majority of only two seats to any potential ÖVP-SPÖ alliance. Under these circumstances, the liberal NEOS were invited to negotiations to form a broader coalition. However, the talks dragged on and ultimately failed, with the NEOS leadership criticizing the SPÖ for refusing to include a pension reform in the coalition’s program. The ÖVP then broke off the talks, citing an insurmountable conflict with the SPÖ over tax increases.
The outgoing Chancellor, Karl Nehammer, was forced to admit that his coalition strategy had failed and announced his resignation as Chancellor and ÖVP leader. His Foreign Minister, Alexander Schallenberg, took over the government to manage ongoing affairs.
The most spectacular event, however, occurred on January 6, when the President gave Herbert Kickl a mandate to form the next government. Alexander van der Bellen, a former Green, had sworn not to participate in this process, especially given the FPÖ’s radical stance on immigration, appeasement with Russia, and opposition to supporting Kiev, as well as his criticism of the European Union.
In the face of the failure to build an anti-FPÖ coalition, the new ÖVP leader eventually opened the door for talks with Kickl to form a future government with the FPÖ at the helm, a prospect that was previously deemed unacceptable. Under these circumstances, the President had little choice but to do so.
An ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, already present in four federal states, would not be a novelty, having occurred from 2000 to 2005 and then from 2017 to 2019. In the first sequence, the European Union even imposed sanctions on Vienna, as it believed that the extreme right should be denied access to power. European leaders eventually had to admit that this direct interference in the formation of a national government only strengthened the FPÖ, which had an aura of victimhood.
This time, the FPÖ would inherit the Chancellor’s office, with the ÖVP as a smaller partner. A unprecedented situation that raises the “risk” of an rapprochement with the “pro-Russia” Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister, who is already a thorn in the side of Brussels. Along with Robert Fico’s Slovakia, Austria would be the third country to break the “prorussian consensus” in the EU.
We are not there yet: while economic issues are no major obstacle between the ÖVP and FPÖ, it is not certain whether a consensus can be found in foreign and European policy. President van der Bellen swore to always uphold the “pillars of democracy” including the rule of law, free and independent media, and EU membership, but in the event of a failure to form a government, new elections would likely be held. The FPÖ could potentially emerge stronger, arguing that the attempts to create a “cordon sanitaire” against it only led to three months of chaos in the country.
In Brussels, the nightmare is far from over. The EU’s political model – two or three parties, classified as “center-right” and “center-left” and alternating or sharing power – seems to be faltering in an increasing number of countries.