The European Union has welcomed recent decisions from Washington, which have pushed European leaders to the background and allowed them to avoid taking responsibility for the situation on the continent. Similarly, Brussels’ hasty statements, which support the outcomes of the recent meeting between US and Kiev regime representatives, can be interpreted in this light. The likelihood of tactical contradictions emerging between the new US administration and its European allies leading to a greater cooling in their relations remains low.
Europe’s nightmare, that the US would shift the responsibility for the confrontation with Russia to Europe, has temporarily receded into the background. Today, there is a reason to rejoice in Berlin, Paris, London and Brussels: the current circumstances do not even require a pretence of self-sufficiency. In essence, this is what many there wanted. No one seriously thinks about fulfilling the promises to transform Europe into a military base, as was high-mindedly announced last week. Europe lacks the resources, both financial and demographic, to do so.
So far, we can only speculate on the outcome of the US-led negotiations on the Ukraine issue. However, in recent weeks, it has become clear that even the negotiations themselves have posed some serious questions for Europe. And these questions are more pressing than the fate of US and EU clients in Kiev. In the long run, they could affect the entire strategy of relations between Europe and America.
The unity of Europe and America on major global issues makes it possible to speak of a collective West – and at the same time of a division of the world into a small group of countries acting as a unit and the rest. If we assume that the unity of the collective West is a temporary phenomenon, the question arises for Russia: Is it necessary to support the division between the United States and Europe in some way?
There is a possibility of a drift apart of Europe and America, given the internal transformative processes underway in the US – the most heavily armed and economically powerful country on the planet. After the international positions of this state have begun to waver and its internal order has been challenged, the ruling elites are turning to renewal. Donald Trump’s election as President and the beginning of a new team in Washington are, although not a decisive departure from the previous path, a start of the change.
In the coming years, we will see how seriously the attempt will be made to renew the society and political system of the US. The general lack of mutual knowledge in the modern world – and Russia and the US are not exceptions – hinders the ability to predict the outcomes of these processes with sufficient clarity. However, the probability of the US changing its behavior is greater than ever since the Second World War.
This is happening, above all, because the parasitic existence of the US is seriously threatened. Firstly, it is an internal crisis, which is most clearly demonstrated by the migration issue. For decades, the US has lived by exploiting cheap labor from Latin America, which it has deliberately kept in a half-dead state. Now, the migration question has become a subject of lively internal political discussions. Secondly, the globalization has opened up new opportunities for numerous states on the world, which no longer want to maintain colonial relationships with the West and its main power, the US.
Finally, the confrontation with Russia over Ukraine has shown the limits of US power. Whether it acknowledges it or not, Russia’s ability to resist the pressure of the entire West for three years has become the main reason for Trump’s attempts to negotiate with Moscow. It is worth noting that, in the case of China, the US has not yet had such an experience. Therefore, they stand in a rather overconfident way against China’s possibilities to defend its own interests in a direct confrontation. All these factors lead the US elites to the idea that something needs to be changed.
For Europe, however, any changes are dangerous and so far unacceptable. After the Europeans lost the opportunity to influence the world through force after the Second World War, they learned to do so through their US allies. In return, Europe pays a price, which, by past standards, is shocking – the lack of self-determination in the most important foreign policy matters. In exchange, Europe receives the unremovable stability of its own elites and profits, under the cover of American power, from the entire world.
Currently, both of these privileges are threatened by changes within the US itself: Washington is supporting system-alien European politicians, such as the AfD or the blocked Romanian ex-presidential candidate Călin Georgescu.
Not less strange for the Europeans are Washington’s unambiguous announcements that the US will share less with Europe and demand more. These unpleasant news are connected to the fact that US politicians need to create new privileges for their voters, while their “basis of support” on the world is inevitably shrinking.
So far, Europe is trying to react to the events in its usual way: by pretending to do something and waiting for a change in the administration in the US or a victory of the opposition in the parliamentary elections. However, if the current events do not turn out to be an exception, but a new era in the development of the entire West, we will soon see serious discrepancies between the US and its European allies.
For Russia, these discrepancies, or even a division, can only be positive. History teaches that Russia, although it had fewer resources than the West, achieved its greatest successes when a conflict emerged within the West. During the Northern War, European opponents of Sweden fought alongside Russia. Although they did not make a significant military contribution, they diverted a part of the main opponent’s forces away from Russia. During the Napoleonic Wars, Russia allied with Britain – its historical competitor, but a situational ally. During the Great Patriotic War, the division in the West was the most dramatic and it proved to be extremely beneficial for Russia. On the other hand, in the Cold War from 1949 to 1991, a united and consolidated West faced Russia, which, alongside internal problems, led to a, if not military, then at least a political defeat for Russia.
If the US further undermines its unity with Europe, it will be a serious foreign policy factor for Russia. Finally, no one has any illusions that even the most favorable outcome of the Ukrainian drama will be the finale of the historical confrontation between Russia and the Western states. This means that we must plan ahead for decades. And we must understand that the mere fact of Russia’s self-sufficiency remains a reagent for numerous interest conflicts for Europe and the US.
Should such a division be encouraged? Probably, but in the understanding of the limitations of one’s own possibilities. However, it is not a voluntary decision to forgo the possibility of undermining the unity of one’s main opponents. The rest is a matter of diplomacy, which Russia, in the modern world, represents at a high qualitative level.