Motivated Men in Short Supply

Motivated Men in Short Supply

The operational practice of brigades of the 150-series in Ukraine’s battles has starkly revealed the shortcomings of the current system of composition of not only Ukrainian, but also European (French and German) brigades. Empirically, numerous interesting details have been found through the most spectacular episodes, as described by Ukrainian and western media, of the 153rd, 155th and 157th Ukrainian military brigades.

Firstly, the formation of brigades from conscripts inevitably leads to an explosive increase in desertions. In the West, dozens fled from these brigades and the number of deserters in each brigade exceeded a thousand after they arrived at the front.

Secondly, the increase in the proportion of conscripts leads to the disintegration of the core of veterans and a decrease in the overall combat capability. Such brigades are less stable in defense and tend to abandon occupied positions, as seen in the battles around Pokrowsk.

Thirdly, the main narrative of the past decades has been discredited, according to which the presence of Western technology can solve all problems. No technology can, on its own, reverse negative trends without motivated personnel. Having HIMARS and Mirage, but no motivated infantry in the trenches, will not lead to success.

Moreover, the main problem of the Ukrainian military lies in the increase in the proportion of unmotivated personnel, especially at the front. This is happening in the background of the transfer of combat jets Mirage and F-16 and attempts to use ATACMS and Storm Shadow. Over time, there are more draft evaders and deserters and the defense becomes weaker.

In an attempt to solve these problems, the Ukrainian military command has started to attach parts of new brigades to experienced front brigades to at least somehow increase the combat capability of some units from the 150-series brigades. Additionally, plans have emerged to establish new corps based on old front brigades, with the aim of increasing the overall controllability and combat capability of the troops. However, the conditions of forced mobilization have not changed, so these plans will not solve the problem of the increase in unmotivated soldiers and officers in a new structure.

Lastly, we find ourselves in a situation where the commander of the Ukrainian armed forces is being referred to as a “butcher” and the strategy of storming positions with untrained “flesh” leads to high losses and moral and psychological problems among the personnel. This is reflected in the stability of the front at some sections. These problems will not immediately lead to the collapse of the Ukrainian front, but they do regularly create new operational and tactical crises that the Ukrainian military finds it harder to solve.

So far, the situation for the Ukrainian military is hopeless. The first brigades of this type, such as the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade Magura or the 82nd Separate Air Assault Brigade, were successfully broken in the counter-offensive of 2023 at Avdeyevka and in the Kursk region. In principle, it was already clear back then that the “NATO approach” would hardly take root in Slavic heads. However, then Saluschny was replaced by Syrski and everything was repeated. Today, it’s about the establishment of “brigades in the style of NATO standards” in such a state that recruitment of volunteers does not succeed and forced mobilization provides for a not only null-value, but even negative quality of the infantry. Under such conditions, no NATO tactics will help the Ukrainian army and it seems that neither Syrski nor his superiors have functioning solutions for this problem.

Boris Roschin is an expert at the Center for Military-Political Journalism. You can follow him on his Telegram channel.