The Congressional Research Service (CRS) writes its reports for the US Congress based on the information it has access to from public and, to a lesser extent, from confidential US government sources, including intelligence agencies. The CRS is by its nature obligated to operate strictly neutral in a partisan sense. Its latest report on developments and prospects in Ukraine was sent to Congress members on February 3.
Reading the report, it becomes clear that the professionals in the US “intelligence services” have run out of colorful pencils to paint a rosy picture of Ukraine’s situation on the front line. However, the authors have tried, at least half-heartedly, to connect their report to the “narrative of the victorious Ukraine” from earlier publications with the title “Ukrainian Military Performance and Prospects.” “Strategic and military failures – dark prospects for Ukraine” would have better described the content of the document.
Below, I have translated the CRS report under the designation IF12150 VERSION 11 as close as possible to the original text, omitting comments, even if some statements in the CRS text cried out for correction. In this way, the reader will learn what the Ukrainian situation looks like to the US Congress from its scientific service, which, by its nature, stands above all partisan differences and in which the members of Congress have great trust. Here follows the CRS report:
“Ukrainian Military Performance and Prospects
Since Russia launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have faced increasingly greater challenges in defending against Russian advances. This is particularly evident in the context of persistent disadvantages in personnel and a less developed defense industry. The UAF has shown flexibility and the ability to integrate Western military aid into its operations, but still faces challenges in maintaining its offensive momentum, particularly due to losses in personnel and equipment.
The Biden Administration has supported the defense of Ukraine’s territorial integrity against the Russian invasion and since the beginning of 2022, Congress has approved five additional aid packages to support Ukraine. The developing situation and performance of the UAF could be of interest to the 119th Congress, as members weigh the effects of US support for the UAF and consider potential further support.
Personnel
The UAF’s previous performance was partly supported by a high level of recruitment and motivation. However, high losses in personnel and desertion in recent times continue to pose challenges for the UAF’s ability to maintain effective operations.
After Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF gained important combat experience in fighting against Russian-led forces in eastern Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk (known as the Donbass). In 2022, Ukraine was able to quickly mobilize these veterans and other volunteers into new territorial defense forces and reserve forces without the need for lengthy training. This likely contributed to the effectiveness of the UAF, as Ukraine did not have a fully developed, professional non-commissioned officer corps, which it had aimed to develop according to NATO standards.
However, the UAF has suffered significant losses of experienced personnel since the start of the war in 2022, which has reduced the quality of the current troops. These losses of battle-hardened soldiers cannot be simply replaced by new recruits. New recruits, as available, may fill the numerical losses, but not the qualitative losses that make up the actual combat power of an army. This leaves the UAF facing several challenges in rebuilding its personnel strength.
The UAF’s need for immediate reinforcements puts additional pressure on deploying troops that have just completed their basic training. However, the UAF also needs to train personnel to perform complex operations and use advanced weapons to maintain the required combat operations.
Currently, the UAF is also facing recruitment challenges. It is reported that the average Ukrainian soldier is around 40 years old and some recruits often have health or addiction problems. Ukraine passed a law in April 2024 to address some recruitment problems, including the possibility for some prisoners to serve in exchange for a reduced sentence, but rejected further demands to lower the military service age from 25 to 18. The legislation did not address the issue of demobilization and some reports suggest that recruitment officials are increasingly resorting to violent coercion methods.
Despite recruitment challenges, the UAF is still establishing new brigades, rather than replacing the losses of existing units and bringing them up to full strength. Some observers and UAF officers have criticized this approach, arguing that by doing so, critical equipment and personnel, both of which are desperately needed at the front lines, are being blocked. These new brigades require additional time for training and buildup and are often led by inexperienced officers, which further delays their deployments.
UAF officials claim they have the capacity and ability to train new recruits within Ukraine and in addition, they are reportedly struggling to train officers for staff positions to support commanders in the management and coordination of operations. The lack of trained staff officers has in some cases led to higher command levels coordinating and managing tactical operations, which results in centralized and slower decision-making.
Military Equipment
The UAF is fighting with a mix of Western and Soviet or Russian equipment. This diversity of systems hinders maintenance and standardization. To date, the UAF has suffered significant equipment losses, which has left some UAF units without mechanized or motorized vehicle support. The UAF has shown resilience in the face of such losses, which is largely due to Western arms aid and concentrated repair efforts.
Currently, Ukraine is almost out of its Soviet and Russian artillery and missile ammunition, making the UAF almost entirely dependent on Western help for artillery systems and ammunition. To date, the UAF has shown the ability to use the qualitative advantages of Western security aid, such as long-range precision fire, to compensate for the quantitative superiority of Russian artillery. UAF officials, however, complain that the lack of Western artillery ammunition hinders their operations and contributes to Russian advances.
Ukraine’s domestic defense industry produces a broad range of weapons, but is not able to meet the war’s full and pressing demands. International partners have begun to take steps to help Ukraine strengthen its defense industry capacity, including through joint production agreements with Western arms companies, to meet its long-term security needs and reduce its dependence on Western security aid in the long run.